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Keeping a Clean Reputation:
More Evidence on the Perverse Effects of Disclosure
Cary A. Deck and J. Dustin Tracy
November 13, 2020
Abstract
When a principal relies on the advice of an agent, a conflict of interest can encourage the agent to provide
advice that is biased in a self-serving manner. Conventional wisdom suggests that such behavior can be
minimized with disclosure requirements. However, disclosure has been shown to exacerbate self-serving
bias and actually lead to greater harm for the principal in one-shot interactions. In many naturally oc-
curring market settings, agents form reputations, a mechanism that diminishes the incentive to provide
biased advice. In this paper, we test for bias in the advice agents provide when faced with reputation
concerns and examine the impact of disclosure in such an environment. Based on controlled laboratory
experiments, we find little evidence of self-serving bias in the absence of disclosure when agents form
reputations as principals use that information in selecting agents. However, we find that introducing
disclosure leads agents to provide self-serving biased advice.
Keywords: Conflict of Interest, Principal-Agent, Disclosure, Market Competition
JEL-Codes: D82, G14, G18, I18, K12, L14, M55
1 Introduction
Lawyers, financial advisors, doctors and other agents are said to have conflicts of interest if their personal
motivation is at odds with their professional responsibilities to serve their clients (Boatright, 2000). While
there are various policies in place regarding when disclosure of a conflict of interest is required, survey
literature reveals such conflicts are common and undermine trust in professionals. For example, Scholl and
Hung (2018) find there is generally low trust in finical professionals. They report that while 51% of consumers
would prefer their adviser not have a conflict of interest, many consumers lacked awareness of a financial
advisers’ responsibilities or their compensation structure. Ninety-four percent of doctors have a financial
relationship with a pharmaceutical company according to Campbell et al. (2007). They report that most
(83%) doctors received gifts including meals from pharmaceutical companies and many received funding for
continuing education or conference attendance (35%) or payment for speaking or research activity (28%).
Interestingly, Mainous (1995) finds that patients viewed personal gifts to physician less favorably than office
use gifts, believing the former could impact the cost of care. Further, patients who believe physicians
accept gifts from the pharmaceutical industry trust doctors significantly less than those patients who do not
believe physicians accept gifts (Grande et al., 2012). Unsurprisingly, physicians believe that gifts from the
pharmaceutical industry are less influential and more acceptable compared to patient attitudes (Gibbons
et al., 1998).
The propensity for experts to behave in a manner that conflicts with the interest of the principal they
represent has been established in economics through both lab and field experiments (see Kerschbamer and
Sutter (2017) for a review of this literature). The conventional wisdom is that if a principal is aware of an
agent’s conflict of interest then the principal can take appropriate counteraction. As stated by Cain et al.
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(2005, p. 2), “Common sense suggests that recipients of advice will benefit from being more fully informed
when they are made aware of an advisor’s conflict of interest.” This notion has led to widespread requirements
for principals to disclose conflicts of interest, particularly in markets for “credence goods” where the agent
is not able to determine the quality of service provided even after the fact.1 While there is general support
for the disclosure of conflicts of interest, there is some debate about the potential impact. For example,
even though a majority of patients report wanting to know if their doctor received a gift over $100 from a
pharmaceutical company, a majority also say their trust in their doctor would be undermined if they knew
their doctor had received such a gift (Green et al., 2012). Rose et al. (2019) find that disclosing physicians’
financial relations within the healthcare industry improved patient awareness of those relationships, but
actually had no impact on the likelihood of attending an appointment or stated trust and confidence in
physicians. In Massachusetts, a disclosure law reduced prescriptions for both branded and generic antide-
pressants, antipsychotics and statins (Guo and Sriram, 2017). However, the 2012 Federal sunshine law had
little impact on average payments from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers and instead led to higher
payments to fewer doctors (Guo et al., 2017). Similarly, Chen et al. (2019) find that in states with laws
requiring posted public disclosure, payments to physicians who accepted less than $100 decreased. However,
payments to physicians who accepted more than $100 increased.
In a creative experiment, Cain et al. (2005) show that disclosure can exacerbate the problem introduced
by a conflict of interest rather than reducing it. In their study, agents provided estimates of the value of a
jar of coins to principals. Principals were paid based on the accuracy of their own guess as to the value of
the coins in the jar, but agents who had a conflict of interest were paid based on how large the principal’s
estimate was. Cain et al. (2005) find that in the absence of disclosure, agents provide upwardly biased
estimates. This bias leads principals to substantially overestimate the value of the coins. When the conflict
of interest was disclosed to principals, the upward bias exhibited by agents did not decrease, but rather
was dramatically increased. While the principals correctly anticipated agents would provide upwardly biased
estimates, the principals badly underestimated the magnitude of the bias and thus the net effect of disclosure
was actually harmful to the principals. Cain et al. (2011) report four additional experiments examining the
robustness of Cain et al. (2005) and find the result is not unique to jars of coins and that it persists even
with between round feedback. Cain et al. (2011) also show that agents perceive bias behavior as being less
morally unacceptable with disclosure.2
While the counter-intuitive finding of Cain et al. (2005) and Cain et al. (2011) suggest that it may
be optimal to not disclose conflicts of interest, the considered settings are ones in which there are no other
pressures on the agents. Becker (1968) argues that when dishonest behavior has little to no cost it is expected
to be prevalent; so, the observed bias in Cain et al. (2005) in the absence of disclosure is unsurprising. Church
and Kuang (2009) show that principals being able to directly sanction agents, then outcomes are improved.
However, the sanctions introduced by Church and Kuang (2009) are meant to model repercussions like
malpractice claims against doctors and thus are very severe. In many circumstances where principals rely
upon expert advice the opportunity for such dramatic sanctions may not be possible. For example, a doctor
may prescribe a medication produced by a company whose representative regularly gives the doctor gifts over
a different medication that is more likely to be beneficial to the patient. But if the prescribed medication has
an FDA indication for the diagnosed ailment, then a lawsuit against the doctor is unlikely to be successful.
However, many everyday circumstances involve reputation concerns and the fear of lost future opportunities
make dishonesty costly for agents.
The expected effect of maintaining a reputation is straightforward in cases where the principal can easily
asses the performance of an agent ex post, but for credence goods, such as selecting a doctor, financial
1In some sense, the good used in our experiment can be viewed as an “Experience Good” since the principals eventually
learn the true value of that good. However, the distinction of whether experience leads to knowledge of the true value of a
good is not the key to assessing if one made the correct decision in our setting. Instead, what is relevant in our setting is the
relationship between the value of the selected good and the value of the non-selected good. As our principals only receive a
noisy signal of the value of the item not selected, it is difficult to ascertain if one made the best choice and thus our setting has
the fundamental characteristic associated with a credence good.
2Cain et al. (2011) find that principals do discount agents with conflicts of interest when there is a second agent providing
advice that is known to not have a conflict.
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adviser, or lawyer, the effect is less obvious since assessing the agent is difficult. Still, Darby and Karni
(1973) discuss how market forces and reputation can limit fraud for credence goods and Wolinsky (1993)
presents a theoretical proof of how reputation and consumer search can discipline experts. However, the
empirical support for the effectiveness of reputations is less clear. For example, Pope (2009) finds patients
select hospitals based on rankings, but not underlying quality measures of care. Hannan et al. (1994) argue
providing rankings improves quality and decreases mortality rates for coronary artery bypass graft surgery.
But, Mukamel and Mushlin (1998) find the rankings increased market share for low mortality surgeons and
hospitals leading to increased prices for the more highly demanded providers. Dranove et al. (2003) claim
that rankings reduce consumer welfare, at least in the short term, as doctors attempting to improve their
reputations elect to operate on healthier patients, a pattern that leads to increased costs, which results in no
improvement in the outcomes of the healthier patients, but worse outcomes for less healthy patients. Outside
of healthcare, Carl (2008) finds that disclosure of payments increases an agent’s credibility when engaged in
word-of-mouth product promotion, a potential channel through which disclosure could be harmful. It is also
possible that disclosure actually creates confusion, thus generating another path by which disclosure could
be harmful. For home mortgages, Ben-shahar and Schneider (2011) argue that people may not know how to
use disclosed information and that they can only pay attention to so many things so that it is better for the
principals if they are focused on a limited number of key features of the decision.
If reputation is sufficient to discipline agents, it is unclear if disclosure is socially desirable as the upside
benefit is limited and disclosure could actually introduce self-serving bias of assessments. Of course, if agents
exhibited biased assessments even in the presence of reputation concerns, then it is possible that disclosure
could be beneficial, as typically assumed, or harmful, as suggested by some. In this paper we use a controlled
laboratory experiment inspired by Cain et al. (2005) to examine the impact of disclosure on self-serving bias
in assessments by agents in a credence good setting where agents have reputation concerns. In our task,
principals are forced to select between two options of unknown value (jars with indeterminate compositions
of coins), but have to rely on an agent’s assessment of the value of those options. The principal receives a
benefit based on the value of the selected option and a noisy signal of the value of the non-selected option,
both of which are independent of their agent’s behavior. Principals can rate agents after their interaction and
can use the ratings provided by other principals when selecting an agent. Agents have a financial incentive
to encourage a principal to select a particular option (jar of coins), but the agent also has an incentive for
principals to choose to solicit the agent’s assessments. There are two treatments in the experiment: one in
which the agent’s conflict of interest is not disclosed to the principal and one in which it is disclosed. We
measure bias as a systematic overstatement by the agent of the value of the conflicted option in comparison
to the other option. Thus, our use of the term bias coincides with both the statistical definition and the
colloquial one. As a prelude to the results, when there is no disclosure we do not observe systematically
biased assessments of values. But, like Cain et al. (2005), when disclosure is introduced we find that agents
do provide systematically biased assessments of value and principals are unable to fully incorporate this fact
into their decision making.
2 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In this section we lay out the experimental design including the task and procedures. We also present a
simple theoretical model that serves as the basis for our hypothesis.
2.1 Main Experimental Task and Treatments
Our experiment varies whether or not the agents’ conflict of interest is disclosed in an environment in which
an agent’s future earning can be diminished by an unfavorable reputation. In the main experimental task, a
principal (“investor” in the subject interface) must select between two options labeled A and B. The options
are jars of coins and the principal’s value for an option equals the value of the coins in the associated jar.
However, the principal cannot observe the jars directly and instead is forced to rely upon an assessment of the
value of each option provided by an agent (“expert” in the subject interface). The agent has a direct incentive
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to encourage the principal to select option A, but also has an incentive to maintain a good reputation in order
to be selected by other principals in the future as the game is played over multiple rounds. The rationale for
using jars of coins is that the agent always has plausible deniability, even to the researcher, that the reported
estimates of value match the agent’s actual beliefs.3
A session of the experiment involved 12 subjects. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned the role of
principal and half were assigned the role of agent. Once assigned, subjects retained their roles throughout
the entire experiment, which lasted for multiple blocks of distinct rounds.
Table 1 lists the sequence of events within each round of the experiment. In Stage 0, subjects are randomly
assigned to a group consisting of two agents and two principals. Additionally, the value of options A and B
were assigned. In Stage 1, the agents observed two images of jars of coins (labeled “Jar A” and “Jar B”).4
Figure 1 provides a sample of one of the images shown to agents in the experiment. After observing the
images, each agent would provide an estimate for the value of the coins in each jar. In Stage 2, principals see
the mean number of stars each agent in the group has received over the course of the previous rounds in the
current block. In the Disclosure Treatment, agents were also informed that the expert would earn an extra
$0.50 if the principal chooses Jar A. In the Baseline, no such disclosure was made although the agent’s still
had the same conflict of interest. The presence or absence of the disclosure statement is the only difference
between the two treatments.5 The principals then selected an agent, E. An agent earned $0.75 for each
principal that selected the agent. In Stage 3, principals observed v̂EA and v̂EB which are the estimated values
for Jar A and Jar B provided by the agent selected in Stage 2. Principals then select a jar. The principal’s
agent earns an additional $0.50 if the principal selects Jar A. In Stage 4, the value of the selected option,
vEJ , was revealed to the principal. Each principal also received a noisy signal of the true value of the jar that
was not selected. The noisy signal was equal to vEJ   eit where eit  U r$2.00, $2.00s. Principals then rated
their agent on a scale of 1 to 5 stars with 1 star being the worst and 5 stars being the best. Each agent was
informed of their own payoff, the number of principals who selected the agent, and the number of principals
who selected the agent and subsequently selected Jar A. Agents were never informed of the true value of
Jars A and B nor were they informed of their own reputation.6
Stage 5 determines if a block continues for an additional round or not. For Rounds 1 through 4 of each
block, once Stage 4 was completed the process returned to Stage 0 and repeated. However, starting in the
5th round of a block, at Stage 5 the process returned to Stage 0 with a 75% chance and the block ended with
a 25% chance. Thus, the horizon of the block was indefinite although subjects knew the stochastic nature of
the termination. Importantly, reputations did not carry over between blocks. Thus, a new block offered an
agent a chance to start over. This was done out of concern that an agent who formed a bad reputation early
might never have the chance to improve it in later rounds since only selected agents are rated. A single set of
realizations was drawn and used to determine the duration of each block for all sessions in both treatments.
Ultimately, there were four blocks lasting a combined 29 rounds. Agents were paid their cumulative earnings
for two randomly chosen blocks whereas principals received the value of the jar selected in one of the 29
rounds chosen at random.
2.2 Additional Experimental Details
The jars that were used contained mixtures of quarters, dimes, nickels and pennies. The actual values of the
contents ranged from a low of $13.32 to a high of $22.43 with a mean value of $17.77. Jars contained between
175 and 466 coins each. In the instructions it was demonstrated that volume was not a good indicator of
value of coins. The intention was that each image would be used as both Option A and Option B during the
course of the experiment although not in the same round to control for jar-specific characteristics. However,
3This process is similar to Cain et al. (2005) who used jars of coins for the same reason.
4All subjects were informed in the instructions that every jar would contain between $10 and $25.
5In the fist round of a block there were no previous ratings to display. For this reason, in the first round of a block each
principal was assigned to a unique agent. This process ensured that an average rating could be calculated for all principals in
all subsequent rounds of a block.
6These two design choices are meant to mimic situations like health care where the doctor cannot know the true value of
the outcome to the patient and where reputation is often informal.
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Table 1: Sequence of Events within a Round
Stage Active Event Payoffs
Role Agent Principal
0 Set Up Nature Form Groups of 2 Principals and 2 Agents;









1 Estimate Agents Observe images of Jars A & B;
Estimate the value of each jar tv̂1A, v̂1B , v̂2A, v̂2Bu
2 Select Principals [NOT in Baseline: See disclosure statements]
Agent Observe Agents’ r̄Ips) (except round 1)b
Select Agent E  t1, 2u (except round 1)b +75¢(for E)c
3 Select Principals Observe selected Agent’s estimates, v̂EA and v̂EB ; If J=A
Jar Select Jar J P tA,Bu +50¢(for E)c
4 Feedback Principals Receive signals, vEJ and vEJ   eit;d  vEJ
Rate selected Agent rEt P t1, 2, 3, 4, 5ups)
Agents See aggregate selections and own payouts
5 Continue Nature Determine if block continues;e
if yes, r̄Ips) updated and go to Stage 0;
if no, r̄Ips) reset and block ends







b In Round 1, there were no ratings to show, and one Agent is assigned to each Principal ensuring ratings in future rounds.
c The Agent who is not selected earns no payment.
d eit  Up$2, $2q.
e Starting in the 5th round, the block continued for another round with a 75% probability.
due to a programming error, some images were treated as Option A twice or as Option B twice for some
subjects. Therefore, the analysis presented in the next section is limited to cases where an image was used
both for Option A and Option B over the course of the experiment.7
The experiment was implemented via oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and conducted at the Economic Science
Institute at Chapman University. A copy of the instructions is included in Appendix A.1. Subjects were
recruited from the lab’s standing pool of volunteers and none of the subjects had participated in any related
study. Each session lasted up to 90 minutes and subjects earned an average of $22.90 including a $7
participation payment. For both the Baseline and the Disclosure Treatment, three sessions were run involving
a total of 72 subjects.
Guessing the correct value of the coins is challenging. As a demonstration, we encourage the reader to
guess the value of the coins shown in Figure 1 before reading the footnote for this sentence.8 Therefore, a
separate study was conducted to calibrate error in estimating the value of each jar of coins. We refer to this
separate study as the Guess Experiment. Twenty four subjects participated in the Guess Experiment in a
single session at the Economic Science Institute. This session lasted thirty minutes and relied on volunteers
from the same subject pool as the main experiment although no one was allowed to participate in both
the Guess Experiment and the main experiment. Subjects in the Guess Experiment observed the full set of
images used in the main experiment and a quadratic scoring rule was used to incentivize truthful reporting of
the value of the coins in each image.9 The average earnings in the Guess Experiment were $14.58 including
the $7 participation payment.
7Results that include all estimates are not qualitatively different. See Appendix A.2.
8The jar shown in Figure 1 contains $17.73.
9Subjects earned $25 - $2(guess - true value)2 each round, and were paid their average earning over all rounds.
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Figure 1: Sample Image
2.3 Theoretical Model
Levitt and List (2007) present a model in which the utility of agent i for an action has additively separate
terms for the moral component, Mi, and the financial component, Wi. Specifically, they posit
Uipa, v, n, sq Mipa, v, n, sq  Wipa, vq
where a is the action, v is amount of money at stake, n capture societal norms or laws, and s is the scrutiny
the action will receive. For an immoral action the first term will be negative. However, if the second term is
greater than the first, the immoral action will bring agent i a net increase in utility and the agent will take
the action.
In this model, an increase in scrutiny for a given norm increases the moral cost but it has no impact on
the financial benefits (i.e., BMi
Bs   0 and
BWi
Bs  0). Thus, disclosure to the principal that agent i earns a bonus
if the principal chooses one option but not the other should increase the moral scrutiny of the estimates i
reports, which would discourage immoral action by the agent. With the introduction of a reputation the
financial term could also depend on both n and s as well (i.e., v  fpn, s, . . . q). In such a setting an immoral
action leads to both greater moral costs and reduced financial benefit (i.e., BMi




Bs   0). This
would make disclosure even more attractive for principals.
However Cain et al. (2005) speculate that disclosure may actually create a “moral license” to engage in
otherwise socially unacceptable behavior. Effectively, this line of reasoning posits that since the principals
have been warned, they should expect agents to engage in self-serving behavior and account for this when
making their own decisions. This line of reasoning is similar to the old adage of caveat emptor. In terms of
the model by Levitt and List, moral licensing alters the norms, n, such that the immorality of an action is
reduced (i.e., Mipa, v, ndisclosure, sq ¡Mipa, v, nnodisclosure, sqq. If true, the net effect of such moral licensing
is ambiguous and disclosure could lead to more or less self serving behavior. This ambiguity is true even
when taking reputation into account as the financial harm from an immoral action could be reduced as the
norm changes.
Based on this model, our experiment seeks to answer the two following questions which serve as the main
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hypotheses to be tested. First, will agents exhibit a self-serving bias in the presence of reputation concerns?
Second, will the disclosure of the agent’s conflict of interest lead to more self-serving bias on the part of
agents?
3 Results
The results are presented in three subsections. The first subsection reports the estimates of jar values from
the Guess Experiment as these serve as a reference point for estimates reported in the main experiment.
The second subsection focuses on the behavior of agents in the Baseline and in the Disclosure Treatment,
which is the primary focus of the paper and where our two main hypotheses are tested. The third subsection
reports exploratory analysis of the behavior of principals in the Baseline and in the Disclosure Treatment.
3.1 Guess Experiment
The mean guess of jar value was $14.61, while the mean of the true values was $17.78. That is, the average
error was -$3.17. Figure 2 shows a boxplot of the estimates from the Guess Experiment for each jar, ordered
by the actual value of the coins in the jar (and not the order in which subjects in either treatment observed
the jars). The s show the actual value of a given jar while the thick black line gives the median guess and
the gray box shows the interquartile range of guesses. In only 3 out of 30 jars did the median guess not fall
below the true value. In fact, for a sizable majority of the jars the true value exceed the 75th percentile of
guesses.10 A sign test rejects that errors are unbiased (p-value   .001). This leads to Finding 1.
Finding 1: People systematically underestimate the value of jars.
Because people so badly underestimate the true value of the jars, it is possible that someone who was
deliberately inflating their estimates could still systematically report estimates below the true value. For this
reason, we use the estimates from the Guess Experiment as a basis of comparison for identifying agent bias
in stated estimates of value in the main experiment. While it is clear from Figure 2 that there is considerable
variation across individuals with respect to their estimates of the value of a given jar, if agents in the main
experiment are not systemically manipulating their estimates then on average estimates should be equal
across the two experiments.
3.2 Behavior of Agents
Table 2 reports the estimates made by agents for all jars by treatment, and by whether there was a bonus to
the agent if the principal chose that jar (Jar A), or if there was no bonus associated with the jar (Jar B). The
average actual value of $17.81 in Table 2 differs from the $17.78 figure reported in the previous subjection,
because most although not all jars were observed twice by agents during the main experiment and the values
in Table 2 account for the frequency with which the jar was observed.
Table 2: Means by Treatment
Baseline Disclosure Actual Value
Estimate Jar A 16.15 16.28 17.81
Estimate Jar B 16.36 15.88 17.81
10Surowiecki (2005) discusses the “wisdom of crowds” arguing the average value of independent assessments tends to be an
accurate forecast of an unknown value (e.g., average guess of the weight of an ox or the number of jellybeans in a jar tends to
be close to the respective true values. Our subjects do not exhibit a “wisdom of crowds” for the value of coins in a jar.
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Note: Subject guesses for each individual jar are displayed as separate boxplots. Plots are ordered by actual value of the jar.
(Subjects did not see jars in value order.)
Table 3 reports similar information to Table 2, but it is presented as deviations from the average estimates
in the Guess Experiment.11 Table 3 also reports the values from (two-sided) paired t-tests and Wilcox rank-
sum tests comparing agent’s estimates when the jar is and is not bonus eligible (i.e., comparing estimates
for a given image when that image is used as Jar A and Jar B, respectively). In the Baseline, the reported
values for a given jar do not depend on whether the jar is Jar A or Jar B as the difference in estimates is
not statistically different from zero. This result indicates that agents are not systematically favoring the
bonus eligible jar in the Baseline. That is, when the conflict of interest is not disclosed there is no observed
bias on the part of agents in the presence of reputation concerns. However, in the Disclosure Treatment,
the difference is statistically significant with agents reporting higher estimates for a jar when it is the bonus
earning Jar A than when it is the non-bonus earning Jar B. This indicates that disclosure of the conflict of
interest introduces bias into agent estimation despite the presence of reputation concerns.
To further analyze agent behavior we rely upon the following regression equation:
v̂ijt  β0   β1V aluejt   β2Baseline&JarAj   β3Disclosure&JarAj   β4Disclosure&JarBj   εijt
where v̂ijt is agent i’s reported estimate of the value of jar j in round t. V aluejt is a variable that captures
the value of the coins in the jar for which the agent is providing an estimate. For robustness, we consider
both the case where Value is the actual value of the coins in the jar (using the variable ActualV alue) and the
case where Value is the mean guess of the value of the coins in the jar from the Guess Experiment (using the
variable MeanGuess). The main independent variables of interest are the interaction variables: Baseline &
11Attention is restricted to cases in which the agent observed a given jar as both Jar A with a bonus payment and as Jar B
without the bonus. As discussed in the previous section, a programming error meant that not all agents observed all images as
both Jar A and Jar B exactly once during the experiment.
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Table 3: Deviations from Guess Treatment Estimates for Cases in which each Jar was both A and B
Baseline Disclosure
Estimate Jar A 1.77 2.14
Estimate Jar B 1.89 1.63
Difference -0.11 0.52
t-test p-value 0.51 0.01
Numb. Jar Pairings 300 300
Wilcoxon-Test p-value 0.49 0.01
Jar A, Disclosure & Jar A, and Disclosure & Jar B, which are all binary variables that take the value 1 if
the estimate is for the stated jar in the stated condition and take the value 0 otherwise. The omitted group
is Baseline & JarB, which serves as a reference point.
The regression estimation for agent reports is reported in Table 4. Specifications (1) and (3) use
ActualV alue while specifications (2) and (4) use MeanGuess. Specifications (1) and (2) do not include
controls for the specific jars or round within a block nor do they cluster errors by agent, while specifications
(3) and (4) do. We report all four specifications for the sake of robustness. The coefficient estimate for
Baseline & Jar A is not statistically significant in any specification. In fact, it is nominally negative, indi-
cating the mean Jar A reported estimates are, if anything, less than the mean Jar B reported estimates. This
pattern provides further evidence that in the absence of disclosure agents do not provide self-serving biased
estimates systematically favor Jar A. However, as shown in the lower panel, which reports the estimated
difference between β3 and β4, in the Disclosure Treatment agents report that a jar is worth 51.7¢ more when
it is Jar A than when it is Jar B. In all four specifications, this difference is positive and at least marginally
statistically significant. Thus, when the conflict of interest is disclosed to principals then agents do provide
self-serving estimates of jar value. Together, the evidence in Table 3 and Table 4 support Finding 2.
Finding 2A: In the absence of disclosure, agents do not exhibit bias when there are reputation
concerns.
Finding 2B: In the presence of reputation concerns, disclosure of an agent’s conflict of interest
leads to biased and self-serving behavior.
In terms of the model by Levitt and List (2007) discussed in the previous section, the observed behavior
indicates that agents believe disclosure creates a moral license to be self-serving and will reduce the scrutiny
given to agent’s selfish action.
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Table 4: Regression Estimates for Agents’ Estimates of Jars








Baseline & Jar A -0.112 -0.112 -0.112 -0.112
(0.253) (0.215) (0.191) (0.191)
Disclosure & Jar A 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.662) (0.622) (0.660) (0.660)
Disclosure & Jar B -0.506 -0.513 -0.513 -0.513
(0.662) (0.622) (0.534) (0.534)
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Number of Unique IDs 36 36 36 36
Overall R2 0.068 0.285 0.343 0.343
Jar # Controls N N Y Y
Round # Controls N N Y Y
Clustering N N Y Y
Jar A - Jar B for Disclosure 0.517 0.517 0.517 0.517
SE 0.253 0.215 0.313 0.313
P>|t| 0.041 0.016 0.099 0.099
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
3.3 Behavior of Principals
Principals make three sequential decisions each round: selecting an agent, choosing a jar based on the selected
agent’s estimates, and rating the agent. In this subsection we analyze these three activities in turn.
Selecting an Agent
To examine how reputation impacts a principal’s selection of an agent, we estimate the following probit
model:
Agent2it  Φpβ0   β1StarsDiffit   β2Disclosurei  StarsDiffit   εijtq
where Agent2it takes the value 1 if principal i chose Agent 2 in round t and the value 0 if Agent 1 was
chosen. The independent variable, StarsDiff, is the difference in the number of stars each agent has (i.e.,
Agent 2’s rating - Agent 1’s rating) for the two agents in the principal’s group in the given round. StarsDiff
is interacted with a binary variable for the Disclosure Treatment to allow for the rating differential to matter
differentially to principals across treatments. The regression clusters standard errors at the principal level
and includes a random effect for each principal.
Table 5 reports marginal effects from the estimation. Specifications (1) and (2) differ in that specification
(2) includes controls for the specific round within the block while specification (1) does not. The estimation
shows that each additional star in an agent’s rating over and above the rating of the other agent increases
the likelihood of the higher rated being selected by about 32%. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for
the interaction term is indistinguishable from zero, meaning that principals do not evaluate reputations
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differentially across treatments. That principals are more likely to select the agent with the higher rating
indicates that reputation does matter in this setting and that agents are under pressure to maintain a high
rating relative to the other agents. This is stated as Finding 3.
Finding 3: Principals rely on the rating system when selecting an agent and thus agents face
reputation concerns in this setting, although the importance of reputation does not
vary with disclosure of the agent’s conflict of interest.
Table 5: Estimated Marginal Effects of Likelihood of Choosing Agent 2
(1) (2)
VARIABLES
Stars Agent 2 - Stars Agent 1 0.318*** 0.318***
(0.044) (0.043)
Disclosure * (Stars Agent 2 - Stars Agent ) -0.000 0.000
(0.087) (0.086)
Observations 900 900
Round # Controls N Y
Log Likelihood -349.2 -346.2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Choosing a Jar
Similar to the approach we use for identifying which agent a principal selects, we rely on a probit model to
determine what influences the jar a principal selects. Specifically, we rely upon the following specification:
JarBit  Φpβ0   β1EstimateDiff   β2Disclosurei   β3Disclosurei  EstimateDiffit   εitq
where JarBit indicates principal i chose Jar B in round t. The independent variable of interest is Estimate-
Diff, which is the difference in the selected agent’s estimate of Jar A minus the selected agent’s estimate of
Jar B. The regression includes a random effect for each principal and clusters standard errors by principal.
Table 6 reports estimated marginal effects from the probit regression. In specification (1) it is assumed that
there is no difference in jar selection between treatments while specification (2) allows for the difference in
jar selection to vary between treatments. The Disclosure variable tests to see if the variation is significant.
Specification (3) allows for a shift in jar selection due to the treatment as well as in interaction term between
the treatment and EstimateDiff.
The interpretation of the marginal effect of EstimateDiff is that for every dollar that the estimate of
Jar A exceeds Jar B there is a 8% decrease in the chance that Jar B is picked. The negative sign on this
coefficient (in all specifications) is what one would expect if principals believe agent estimations convey useful
information. From specifications (2) and (3), principals in the Disclosure Treatment are actually less likely
to choose Jar B by 10% as compared to the Baseline, ceteris paribus. This effect is the opposite of what
one would observe if principals were wary of choosing Jar A in the Disclosure Treatment, but it is consistent
with principals not fully appreciating the implications of the agent’s conflict of interest and having a desire
to help the agents earn a larger profit. Specification (3) reveals that the impact of differences in the reported
estimated values of the jars does not vary with treatment. This leads to Finding 4.
Finding 4: Subjects directly rely on the agents’ estimates of jar value to determine which option
to select in both treatments. However, Disclosure actually increases the likelihood
that the principal will select the option that benefits the agent ceteris paribus.
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Table 6: Estimated Marginal Effects of Likelihood of Choosing Jar B
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES




Disclosure * (Est. Jar A - Est. Jar B) 0.016
(0.020)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044
Base Rate 0.384 0.463 0.462
Log Likelihood -496.7 -493.6 -492.1
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Rating the Agent
Figure 3 plots how often each star rating was assigned by treatment. The mean number of stars in the
Disclosure Treatment (3.397) was slightly lower than the mean in the Baseline (3.487), but the difference is
not statistically significant (p-value = 0.226).












1 2 3 4 5
Stars
Baseline Disclosure
To understand how agent performance impacts the rating a principal gives an agent after observing the
true value of the selected jar and the independent noisy signal of the value of the other jar, we rely on the
two following specifications. The first specification classifies jars based on whether the agent had a conflict
of interest with the jar or not (i.e., Jar A versus Jar B).
Starsit  β0   β1AccurateDirectionit   β2OverEstJarAit   β3UnderEstJarAit (1)
 β4OverEstJarBit   β5UnderEstJarBit   εit
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where Starsit is the number of stars principal i assigned the selected agent in round t. AccurateDirection is
a binary variable indicating that the jar the agent reported as having the highest value also had the highest
value based upon the information subsequently revealed to the principal. That is, AccurateDirection takes
the value 1 if the agent provided guidance to the principal that was in the “Accurate Direction” and is 0
otherwise. The remaining variables pertain to the difference between the agent’s estimate of a jar’s value and
the subsequent information received by the principal. OverEstJarX is the amount the principal believes
the agent overestimated the value of Jar X while UnderEstJarX is the amount the principal believes the
agent underestimated the value of Jar X.
The second specification classifies jars based on whether the principal selected the jar or not.
Starsit  β0   β1AccurateDirectionit   β2OverEstP ickit   β3UnderEstP ickit (2)
 β4OverEstOtherit   β5UnderEstOtherit   εit
where, similarly to Equation 1, OverEstP ick (UnderEstP ick, OverEstOther, UnderEstOther) denotes
the amount by which the principal believes the agent over- (under-, over-, under-) estimated the value of
the selected (selected, not selected, not selected) jar, respectively. This approach allows for the possibility
that principals view errors asymmetrically. For both equations 1 and 2 we report 3 estimations. The first
is just the basic specification given above. The second specification includes Disclosure, a binary variable
for the Disclosure Treatment, as well as the interaction of Disclosure and AccurateDirection. The third
specification adds interaction terms for the type of error an agent made and the treatment to allow for the
possibility that overestimation and underestimation are viewed differently between treatments.
Table 7 reports regression estimates using Equation 1 and Table 8 reports regression estimates using
Equation 2. In all three specifications in both tables, the coefficient on AccurateDirection is positive and
statistically significant meaning that principals rate agents higher when the agent’s rank order Jars in a
manner consistent with the independent information the principal receives. From all three specifications in
both Tables 7 and 8 it is clear that agents are penalized for errors in their estimation. Specifications (2) and
(3) in both tables indicate that ratings are not systematically different across treatments (AccurateDirection
& Disclousre is not significant in any specification). The lower panel of both tables provides the p-values
for testing for symmetry among the types of errors that an agent could make in her estimations. For each
case there are 6 possible tests since there are four coefficients for over- and underestimation.12
From Table 7 there is no evidence that overestimation of Jar A is treated differently than overestimation
of Jar B, nor is underestimation viewed differently between jars. However, underestimation of a jar is viewed
more negatively than overestimation of the same jar, although this difference is not always statistically sig-
nificant across specifications and treatments. Interestingly, greater concern for underestimation as compared
to overestimation holds across jars as well, at least for the Baseline. However, in the Disclosure Treatment
when the principal knows the agent has an incentive to make Jar A appear more attractive, this cross-jar
asymmetry disappears. That is, in the Disclosure Treatment, the principal views overestimating Jar A the
same as underestimating Jar B as these two errors both make Jar A appear more attractive.
Unsurprisingly, Table 8 shows that overestimation of the jar selected is viewed more negatively than
underestimation of the jar selected. Additionally, overestimation of the jar selected is viewed more negatively
than overestimation of the jar not selected, which is intuitive. Overall, errors regarding the jar selected are
viewed more negatively than oppositely signed errors for the non-selected jar. Thus, overestimation of the
selected jar leads to a greater reduction in rating than does underestimating the value of the non-selected
jar even though both errors have the same impact on assessing the difference in value between the two jars.
But this asymmetry is limited to the Baseline as indicated by the tests of specification (3).
The results reported in Tables 7 and 8 support the final finding.
12For specification (3) in Tables 7 and 8 there are 6 tests for each treatment since the impact of errors is allowed to vary by
treatment.
13
Table 7: Estimated Impacts on Ratings Given to Agent using Jar Identity
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
AccuateDirection 0.555*** 0.506*** 0.486***
(0.134) (0.114) (0.115)
OverEstJarA -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.127***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
UnderEstJarA -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.208***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022)
OverEstJarB -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.095***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028)




AccuateDirection & Disclosure 0.097 0.137
(0.266) (0.265)
OverEstJarA & Disclosure 0.068
(0.044)
UnderEstJarA & Disclosure 0.048
(0.045)
OverEstJarB & Disclosure -0.044
(0.046)
UnderEstJarB & Disclosure 0.103*
(0.056)
Constant 3.962*** 3.982*** 4.099***
(0.159) (0.168) (0.178)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044
Number of Unique IDs 36 36 36
Tests of symmetry
OverEstJarA = UnderEstJarA 0.000 0.000 0.001
OverEstJarB = UnderEstJarB 0.131 0.153 0.000
OverEstJarA = OverEstJarB 0.496 0.500 0.341
UnderEstJarA = UnderEstJarB 0.633 0.608 0.936
OverEstJarA = UnderEstJarB 0.077 0.083 0.015
UnderEstJarA = OverEstJarB 0.091 0.086 0.000
OverEstJarA + OverEstJarADisc = UnderEstJarA + UnderEstJarADisc 0.005
OverEstJarB + OverEstJarBDisc = UnderEstJarB + UnderEstJarBDisc 0.449
OverEstJarA + OverEstJarADisc = OverEstJarB + OverEstJarBDisc 0.170
UnderEstJarA + UnderEstJarADisc = UnderEstJarB + UnderEstJarBDisc 0.465
OverEstJarA + OverEstJarADisc = UnderEstJarB + UnderEstJarBDisc 0.437
UnderEstJarA + UnderEstJarADisc = OverEstJarB + OverEstJarBDisc 0.715
The results in the first four rows for specification (3) examine symmetry in the baseline
and the last four test rows of specification test for symmetry in Disclosure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
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Table 8: Estimated Impacts on Ratings Given to Agent Using Jar Selection
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES RateAgnt RateAgnt RateAgnt
AccuateDirection 0.517*** 0.436*** 0.501***
(0.113) (0.112) (0.111)
OverEstPick -0.244*** -0.246*** -0.274***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.031)
UnderEstPick -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.161***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
OverEstOther -0.050** -0.047* -0.087***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024)




AccuateDirection & Disclosure 0.159 0.045
(0.263) (0.226)
OverEstPick & Disclosure 0.058
(0.053)
UnderEstPick & Disclosure 0.110*
(0.062)
OverEstOther & Disclosure 0.056
(0.047)
UnderEstOther & Disclosure -0.081*
(0.043)
Constant 4.011*** 4.064*** 4.068***
(0.139) (0.166) (0.179)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044
Number of Unique IDs 36 36 36
OverEstPick = UnderEstPick 0.000 0.000 0.000
OverEstOther = UnderEstOther 0.0630 0.0680 0.476
OverEstPick = OverEstOther 0.000 0.000 0.000
UnderEstPick = UnderEstOther 0.958 0.976 0.006
OverEstPick = UnderEstOther 0.000 0.000 0.000
OverEstOther = UnderEstPick 0.100 0.083 0.080
OverEstPick + OverEstPickDisc = UnderEstPick + UnderEstPickDisc 0.001
OverEstOther + OverEstOtherDisc = UnderEstOther + UnderEstOtherDisc 0.030
OverEstPick + OverEstPickDisc = OverEstOther + OverEstOtherDisc 0.008
UnderEstPick + UnderEstPickDisc = UnderEstOther + UnderEstOtherDisc 0.220
OverEstPick + OverEstPickDisc = UnderEstOther + UnderEstOtherDisc 0.256
OverEstOther + OverEstOtherDisc = UnderEstPick + UnderEstPickDisc 0.730
The results in the first four rows for specification (3) examine symmetry in the baseline
and the last four test rows of specification test for symmetry in Disclosure.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Finding 5: Principals reward agents with higher ratings when the agent appears to correctly
identify the best option and punish agents with lower ratings for misestimation.
The reduction in rating tends to be greater for underestimation than overestima-
tion of a given jar; however, with Disclosure principals view overestimating one jar
and underestimating the other jar as comparable. After selecting a jar, principals
are more strongly concerned with errors regarding the selected jar; but, with Dis-
closure principals view overestimation of the selected jar as being comparable to
underestimation of the other jar.
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4 Discussion
Conventional wisdom suggests that an agent’s conflict of interest should be disclosed to principals. However,
such an policy may prove harmful if disclosure creates a moral license that emboldens agents and encourages
them to act in self-serving ways, especially if the magnitude of this effect is not fully appreciated by principals.
This negative effect was reported in Cain et al. (2005). Our paper extends the basic structure of Cain et al.
(2005) to a repeated interaction situation in which agents have reputation concerns. The goal of our paper
is two-fold. First, we seek to understand if the disciplining effect of maintaining a reputation can offset the
incentives created by a conflict of interest. Second, we examine the effect of disclosure in a setting where
agents have reputation concerns.
In our experimental task, principals rated agents based on the agent’s performance estimating the value
of options available to the principal. In turn, principals could select agents based upon those ratings. Agents
had a conflict of interest in that they received a direct benefit from increasing the principals belief about
the relative value of a particular option. In the absence of disclosure, agents did not provide self-serving
biased estimates. This indicates that reputation concerns alone can be enough to offset conflicts of interest.
However, when disclosure of the conflict of interest was required self-serving behavior on the part of agents
was observed. The observed manipulation involved a mix of inflating estimates of the option that provided
a benefit to the agent and deflating the estimate of the other option. Thus, we find that the counterintuitive
result of Cain et al. (2005) that disclosure can exacerbate a conflict of interest holds even in the presence of
reputation concerns.
While not the main focus of our study, the observed behavior does provide some additional insights.
First, we find that mis-estimation of an option, whether it is ultimately the one selected or not, leads to a
reduction in the rating a principal assigns to an agent. However, in the Baseline overestimating the benefit
from a selected option leads to a greater reduction in the rating than underestimation of the value of an
option not selected despite these errors having similar implications for the principal. But, with Disclosure
principals view the two errors similarly. Second, we find that disclosure does not change how principals
evaluate agents given their performance. In particular, disclosure does not lead to differences in how over- or
underestimation of a particular option is treated. Finally, we note that our subjects were unable to accurately
guess the value of the options, which were jars of coins, in a separate experiment used to calibrate unbiased
expectations of those values. Instead, average estimates were systematically below the actual values contrary
to the arguments in Surowiecki (2005).
It is worth noting that the success of reputation concerns in deterring self-serving behavior by agents
may be dependent upon two key features of our setting. First, principals in our study were effectively
consuming a credence good since they could not verify the quality of their choice. However, the principals
did receive a noisy signal of the quality. Second, the size of the conflict of interest was relatively small in that
a majority of the agent’s earnings were from being selected by a principal rather than having the principal
select a particular choice. Whether a conflict of interest would lead to self-serving behavior when reputation
concerns are present when either or both of these features is relaxed remains an important question. Similarly,
the negative effects of disclosure that we observe may or may not hold as these two factors are relaxed. It
is certainly possible that principals who know that agents have a substantial conflict of interest or who have
weaker signals of agent performance may behave differently. We hope that our work will spark interest in
these important avenues for future research.
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The experiment instruction were computerized, but subjects were informed that they could raise their hand
if they had any questions. Screenshots of instructions are below.
Guess Treatment
The Guess Treatment had two instruction screens.
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Main Treatments




In Round 1, agents saw Jars 1 and 2; for Agent 1 Jar 1 was Jar A and Jar 2 was Jar B, vice versa for Agent
2. In Round 2, agents saw Jars 3 and 4, assigned to A and B as above. Rounds continued like this until
Round 15. In Round 15, agents saw Jars 1 and 2 a second time, with the assignment to A and B reversed.
For Agent 2 Jar 1 was Jar A and Jar 2 was Jar B. This reversal occurred in Rounds 16 - 28 as well with
each round being a swap of the round 14 rounds earlier. However, in round 29, the last given the random
termination, Agents saw Jar 29 and Jar 30, which they had not seen before. Because of the odd number of
rounds not every jar was observed twice.
Table A.1: KEEP ALL Regression Estimates for Agents’ Estimates of Jars
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Constant 9.254*** 3.544*** -131.457*** 3.011**





Baselime & JarA -0.205 -0.205 -0.205 -0.205
(0.200) (0.163) (0.175) (0.175)
Disclosure & Jar A -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 -0.075
(0.560) (0.554) (0.573) (0.573)
Disclosure & Jar B -0.480 -0.480 -0.480 -0.480
(0.560) (0.554) (0.515) (0.515)
Observations 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088
Number of Unique IDs 36 36 36 36
Overall R2 0.0701 0.318 0.356 0.356
Jar # Controls N N Y Y
Round # Controls N N Y Y
Clustering N N Y Y
JarA - JarB for Disclosure 0.405 0.405 0.405 0.405
SE 0.200 0.163 0.223 0.223
P>|t| 0.043 0.013 0.069 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Had every subject always been Agent 1 or always been Agent 2, every agent would have two estimates
for each jar (1 to 28); one when the jar was Jar A and one when it was Jar B. However, there was an error
in the logic of our program. A subject who was Agent 1 in the first half, e.g., Round 1, of the experiment
could be Agent 2 14 rounds later, e.g., Round 15. As a result, while we have two estimates for each jar from
1-28 from each agent, for some agents some jars were estimates twice as Jar A and for others the jars were
estimated twice as Jar B. For the analysis in the body of the paper, we only included estimates for which
there were Jar A and Jar B estimates for the same jar by the same agent. Table A.1 reports estimates from
repeating the regressions in Table 4 including all the estimates. The results are qualitatively similar. In the
Baseline, guesses for the value of Jar B are larger than those for Jar A, but not by a statistically significant
margin. In contrast, in the Disclosure Treatment, the guesses for the value of Jar A were 41¢ higher than
those for Jar B.
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A.3 Ordered Probit Regressions
Tables A.2 through A.4 present results from analysis complementary to that reported in Table 7. However,
rather than treating the number of stars awarded to an agent as a continuous variable, this supplementary
analysis treats the ratings as discrete ranked options and thus uses ordered probit regressions. Each table
reports the marginal effects of the probit regression in parallel to one of the specifications in Table 8. For
these tables, each column is the effect from a single independent variable and each row is the change in the
likelihood of an agent receiving that number of stars for a one unit change in the variable. The results are
consistent with those from Table 8.
Table A.2: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Jar A vs. B, Model 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstJarA UnderEstJarA OverEstJarB UnderEstJarB
1 Star -0.0640*** 0.0106*** 0.0192*** 0.0131*** 0.0176***
(0.0189) (0.00312) (0.00391) (0.00302) (0.00387)
2 Stars -0.0785*** 0.0130*** 0.0236*** 0.0160*** 0.0216***
(0.0179) (0.00342) (0.00377) (0.00344) (0.00467)
3 Stars -0.0512*** 0.00845*** 0.0154*** 0.0105*** 0.0141***
(0.0125) (0.00215) (0.00346) (0.00319) (0.00402)
4 Stars 0.0440*** -0.00727*** -0.0132*** -0.00900*** -0.0121***
(0.0109) (0.00231) (0.00267) (0.00230) (0.00324)
5 Stars 0.150*** -0.0247*** -0.0449*** -0.0306*** -0.0412***
(0.0342) (0.00560) (0.00660) (0.00645) (0.00793)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Table A.3: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Jar A vs. B, Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstJarA UnderEstJarA OverEstJarB UnderEstJarB DISC DirectAccDISC
1 Star -0.0603*** 0.0106*** 0.0193*** 0.0131*** 0.0176*** 0.00277 -0.00725
(0.0143) (0.00311) (0.00394) (0.00300) (0.00384) (0.0231) (0.0302)
2 Stars -0.0741*** 0.0130*** 0.0236*** 0.0161*** 0.0216*** 0.00341 -0.00890
(0.0180) (0.00333) (0.00372) (0.00347) (0.00478) (0.0281) (0.0365)
3 Stars -0.0483*** 0.00849*** 0.0154*** 0.0105*** 0.0141*** 0.00222 -0.00580
(0.0132) (0.00208) (0.00341) (0.00319) (0.00406) (0.0184) (0.0237)
4 Stars 0.0416*** -0.00730*** -0.0133*** -0.00900*** -0.0121*** -0.00191 0.00499
(0.0116) (0.00228) (0.00267) (0.00234) (0.00331) (0.0157) (0.0204)
5 Stars 0.141*** -0.0248*** -0.0451*** -0.0306*** -0.0411*** -0.00649 0.0170
(0.0293) (0.00549) (0.00659) (0.00645) (0.00804) (0.0538) (0.0700)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
22
Table A.4: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Jar A vs. B, Model 3
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstJarA UnderEstJarA OverEstJarB UnderEstJarB DISC
1 Star -0.0582*** 0.0145*** 0.0231*** 0.0109*** 0.0239*** 0.0304
(0.0142) (0.00364) (0.00439) (0.00361) (0.00466) (0.0345)
2 Stars -0.0715*** 0.0178*** 0.0283*** 0.0134*** 0.0294*** 0.0373
(0.0179) (0.00391) (0.00387) (0.00371) (0.00441) (0.0391)
3 Stars -0.0468*** 0.0116*** 0.0185*** 0.00876*** 0.0192*** 0.0244
(0.0131) (0.00268) (0.00409) (0.00328) (0.00496) (0.0268)
4 Stars 0.0399*** -0.00991*** -0.0158*** -0.00747*** -0.0164*** -0.0208
(0.0113) (0.00283) (0.00356) (0.00247) (0.00339) (0.0219)
5 Stars 0.137*** -0.0339*** -0.0541*** -0.0256*** -0.0562*** -0.0712
(0.0294) (0.00606) (0.00593) (0.00759) (0.00855) (0.0779)
VARIABLES DirectAccDISC OverEstJarADisc UnderEstJarADisc OverEstJarBDisc UnderEstJarBDisc
1 Star -0.0111 -0.00789 -0.00587 0.00421 -0.0120*
(0.0298) (0.00492) (0.00513) (0.00522) (0.00655)
2 Stars -0.0136 -0.00970 -0.00722 0.00517 -0.0147**
(0.0355) (0.00614) (0.00619) (0.00671) (0.00743)
3 Stars -0.00891 -0.00634 -0.00472 0.00338 -0.00963*
(0.0232) (0.00419) (0.00424) (0.00432) (0.00552)
4 Stars 0.00760 0.00541 0.00403 -0.00288 0.00822**
(0.0197) (0.00355) (0.00375) (0.00370) (0.00410)
5 Stars 0.0260 0.0185 0.0138 -0.00987 0.0281*
(0.0688) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0150)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
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Tables A.5 through A.7 present results from analysis complementary to that reported in Table 8. How-
ever, rather than treating the number of stars awarded to an agent as a continuous variable, this supplemen-
tary analysis treats the ratings as discrete ranked options and thus uses ordered probit regressions. Each
table reports the marginal effects of the probit regression in parallel to one of the specifications in Table 8.
For these tables, each column is the effects from a single independent variable and each row is the change in
the likelihood of an agent receiving that number of stars for a one unit change in the variable. The results
are consistent with those from Table 8.
Table A.5: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Selected vs. Other, Model 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstPick UnderEstPick OverEstOther UnderEstOther
1 Star -0.0592*** 0.0274*** 0.0122*** 0.00496* 0.0117***
(0.0156) (0.00486) (0.00353) (0.00273) (0.00334)
2 Star -0.0728*** 0.0337*** 0.0150*** 0.00610* 0.0144***
(0.0156) (0.00452) (0.00461) (0.00350) (0.00320)
3 Star -0.0485*** 0.0224*** 0.00999*** 0.00406 0.00962***
(0.0116) (0.00463) (0.00363) (0.00251) (0.00223)
4 Star 0.0404*** -0.0187*** -0.00831*** -0.00338* -0.00800***
(0.00918) (0.00361) (0.00284) (0.00205) (0.00227)
5 Star 0.140*** -0.0649*** -0.0289*** -0.0117* -0.0278***
(0.0297) (0.00753) (0.00835) (0.00656) (0.00569)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
Table A.6: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Selected vs. Other, Model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstPick UnderEstPick OverEstOther UnderEstOther DISC DirectAccDISC
1 star -0.0521*** 0.0275*** 0.0122*** 0.00473* 0.0118*** 0.00946 -0.0139
(0.0126) (0.00491) (0.00356) (0.00282) (0.00339) (0.0235) (0.0300)
2 Stars -0.0641*** 0.0339*** 0.0150*** 0.00582 0.0145*** 0.0116 -0.0171
(0.0178) (0.00442) (0.00463) (0.00368) (0.00323) (0.0280) (0.0357)
3 Stars -0.0427*** 0.0225*** 0.00996*** 0.00387 0.00968*** 0.00775 -0.0114
(0.0131) (0.00453) (0.00363) (0.00261) (0.00224) (0.0189) (0.0237)
4 Stars 0.0355*** -0.0187*** -0.00827*** -0.00322 -0.00804*** -0.00644 0.00947
(0.0112) (0.00360) (0.00288) (0.00216) (0.00228) (0.0153) (0.0195)
5 Stars 0.123*** -0.0652*** -0.0288*** -0.0112 -0.0280*** -0.0224 0.0330
(0.0293) (0.00754) (0.00838) (0.00684) (0.00583) (0.0551) (0.0698)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
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Table A.7: Order Probit of Impacts on Rating given to Agent, Selected vs. Other, Model 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES DIRECTACC OverEstPick UnderEstPick OverEstOther UnderEstOther DISC
1 Star -0.0599*** 0.0311*** 0.0185*** 0.00899*** 0.00754*** 0.0161
(0.0137) (0.00549) (0.00457) (0.00310) (0.00242) (0.0301)
2 Stars -0.0736*** 0.0382*** 0.0227*** 0.0110*** 0.00926*** 0.0197
(0.0177) (0.00487) (0.00452) (0.00359) (0.00264) (0.0357)
3 Stars -0.0491*** 0.0255*** 0.0151*** 0.00736*** 0.00618*** 0.0132
(0.0126) (0.00586) (0.00414) (0.00259) (0.00189) (0.0247)
4 Stars 0.0404*** -0.0210*** -0.0124*** -0.00606*** -0.00508*** -0.0108
(0.0117) (0.00441) (0.00335) (0.00227) (0.00177) (0.0194)
5 Stars 0.142*** -0.0739*** -0.0438*** -0.0213*** -0.0179*** -0.0381
(0.0280) (0.00902) (0.00868) (0.00660) (0.00479) (0.0709)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES DirectAccDISC UnderEstPickDisc OverEstPickDisc UnderEstOtherDisc OverEstOtherDisc
1 Star -0.000301 -0.0131* -0.00737 0.00873* -0.00595
(0.0248) (0.00738) (0.00597) (0.00525) (0.00541)
2 Stars -0.000370 -0.0161** -0.00906 0.0107* -0.00730
(0.0305) (0.00787) (0.00727) (0.00599) (0.00632)
3 Stars -0.000247 -0.0107* -0.00604 0.00715* -0.00487
(0.0203) (0.00570) (0.00538) (0.00400) (0.00410)
4 Stars 0.000203 0.00881* 0.00497 -0.00588* 0.00401
(0.0167) (0.00471) (0.00423) (0.00341) (0.00345)
5 Stars 0.000716 0.0311* 0.0175 -0.0207* 0.0141
(0.0589) (0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0116) (0.0123)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044
Standard errors in parentheses *** p 0.01, ** p 0.05, * p 0.1
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